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ART THREATS AND FIRST
AMENDMENT DISRUPTION
ANDREW JENSEN KERR*
ABSTRACT
The novel problem of art threats, typified by threatening rap lyrics,
has destabilized our First Amendment regime. We have traditionally
relied on industry gatekeepers like music labels or museum curators to
determine what counts as art. However, with the advent of the Internet,
amateur artists can share their aesthetic output with a public audience,
bypassing the threshold quality control work of the Art World. This has
forced courts to acknowledge foundational questions about what kind
of art is covered by the First Amendment. In brief, it covers “good” art.
In this paper I offer a synthetic conception of the First Amendment
that contextualizes this aesthetic gatekeeper problem within a freedom of
speech doctrine that has been forced to distinguish art from threat. I echo
the claims of law and rap scholars that the amateur attempt at rap should
be interpreted within a permissive standard for political speech, but I
remind this scholarly network that our category of art speech still
connotes a threshold level of quality. Young artists need help with selfediting; they do not need to be punished. But this does not mean the
amateur attempt at art should be reified as good art within our
constitutional law doctrine. I thus consider some pragmatic solutions for
how either civil society or the state can mirror the essential quality
control work done by prior Art World actors. My thinking is informed
by a noble understanding of rap as well as the cultural assumptions that
explain the boundaries of the First Amendment.
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I. HOW WE FRAME ART
Rapper Yasiin Bey (better known as “Mos Def”) recently debuted
an immersive exhibit at the Brooklyn Museum for his newest album,
Negus.1 It was a novel approach, especially compared to the industry
trend of “bundling” music with apparel or other merchandise to
improve album sales or streaming numbers.2 Whereas many recording
artists are experimenting with marketing strategies to popularize their
music, Bey chose to intentionally limit initial access to his newest
release. He relied instead on exclusivity, critical reputation and
aesthetic experience to distinguish his album from the infinite amount
of new music available on the internet. Bey’s strategy is also an explicit

1. yasiin bey: Negus, BROOKLYN MUSEUM (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.brooklynmuseum.
org/exhibitions/yasiin_bey_negus.
2. Anne Steele, Want an Album With That T-Shirt? Billboard Tightens Rules on Bundling
Music and Merchandise, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/want-analbum-with-that-t-shirt-billboard-tightens-rules-on-bundling-music-and-merchandise11574776800.
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nod to the notion that rap is art, and that like conventional visual
installations, his music is best appreciated in a museum context.
It is no longer avant-garde to observe how the institutional
processes of the Art World (i.e., record labels, critics, and fans) frame
our understanding of whether something is received as “art” rather
than mere craft or kitsch. For example, Bey’s experimental brand of rap
music registers as aesthetic in part because of the initial decision of
museum curators to present it and record labels to distribute it. The
community of rap critics verified Bey’s status as a rapper, so audiences
are primed to hear his innovative musical gestures as raps.
There is a qualitative boundary separating Bey’s work from the
amateur attempt at rap because other gatekeepers acknowledged its
value first. For most of the twentieth century, courts were able to
delegate the question of “What is art?” to market players.3 Once
someone purchased a sculpture, visual painting, a ticket to a play, or a
musical recording, a judge could cite to these economic decisions as
evidence of the artfulness of a given work. This allowed courts to avoid
the difficult problem of aesthetic relativism first identified by Justice
Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.4 and later echoed
by Justice Scalia in Pope v. Illinois.5 Judges deferred to institutional
gatekeepers and the context of an artwork to determine whether an
unconventional piece had aesthetic value and thus protection under the
First Amendment.6
So, it did not matter that parents thought their six-year-old child was
capable of producing a Jackson Pollock look-alike.7 The Art World
loved Pollock, and this institutional pedigree made his artwork

3. See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 836–39 (noting that
Courts have resigned themselves to reaching “bald” conclusions about an object’s art status
without including adequate analysis to support their statements). See also, e.g., Parks v. LaFace
Records, 329 F.3d 437, 463 (6th Cir. 2003) (confirming it is not the role of judges to make
individualized aesthetic determinations); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.
4th 387, 409 (Cal. 2001) (confirming that courts are not to value one form of depiction over
another); Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that
originality in copyright law is a legal standard).
4. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
5. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504–05 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1253–54
(1995) (finding that the institutional context of an art exhibition like Marcel Duchamp’s
readymade sculpture, Fountain, reinforced its First Amendment protections).
7. See Ellen Winner, Could Your Child Really Paint That?, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 19,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/could-your-child-really-paint-that-1539959482 (referring to
recent academic studies that show even the untrained eye can detect quality differences in abstract
artwork).
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something separate and unique from the haphazard paint splatters of a
kindergartener. Indeed, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, Justice Souter remarked that the First
Amendment “unquestionably shielded . . . [the] painting of Jackson
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, [and] Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll.”8 But because free speech doctrine is commonly
understood to protect the transmission of ideas, judges and scholars
have struggled to articulate a principle for why First Amendment
doctrine protects aesthetic items like abstract art,9 nonsensical poetry,
or atmospheric lyrics in rap songs.10
It is difficult to identify a factual hypothetical for when the legality
of a Jackson Pollock painting might be legitimately challenged. His
160-square-foot canvas “Mural” (1943) could be distracting as a public
art installation for passing motorists, but to my knowledge there are no
Pollocks visible from roadways.11 Like much of modern or
contemporary art, the fact that Pollock’s art does not convey a
“particularized message” places it outside the purview of the criminal
law. Rather, we can read Justice Souter’s line in Hurley as reflecting
the facile logic of “Why not?” We assume there to be little damage done
to First Amendment doctrine by name-checking Pollock’s work, and it
helps to reassure Americans of the prestige value of the First
Amendment. We all agree the First Amendment is special, and so it
should of course protect unique forms of expression like the paintings
of Jackson Pollock and the poetry of Lewis Carroll that are part of our
cultural canon.12 What is there to lose?

8. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
Justice Souter’s passing reference suggests that this is a shared presumption of the legal
community and does not require logical explication. However, prior to opinion in Hurley it was
unclear if art had First Amendment Status. See also Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and
Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221,
222 (“[M]ost commentators consider artistic expression as subservient to, and derivative of,
political expression; they determine the first amendment value of artistic expression primarily, if
not solely, by its resemblance to political expression.”).
9. Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 111 (1996) (The Supreme Court
“should consciously elevate art to the top of the First Amendment’s pyramid of protection,
alongside political speech,” suggesting that at the time of writing it was not part of the normative
hierarchy).
10. See, e.g., Amy Adler, A Decision for the Ages: A Symposium Marking the Centenary
of Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 687, 711 (2018) (“The difficulty of reducing
art works to ‘ideas’ or ‘messages’ has been a recurrent problem in free speech law and theory.”).
11. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, “Art and the First Amendment” in FREE SPEECH BEYOND
WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 72 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds.)
(2017).
12. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
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Outside of outlier cases like Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts
Center,13 where Robert Mapplethorpe’s photography was contested as
obscene, it has been challenging for scholars to identity possible
examples of criminal artwork.14 As recently as 2008 Professor Edward
J. Eberle wrote, “it is hard to imagine art speech constituting
incitement, threats or fighting words. Instances of art speech almost
never involve violence or threatened violence germane to these
categories of unprotected speech.”15 The concept of an “art threat” was
incongruent with a free speech doctrine that does not recognize threats
as speech and was difficult to even conceptualize for an Art World
where aesthetic expression is assumed to be polysemic and received by
a general audience.
The advent of internet rap and performance art has disrupted this
First Amendment regime. These novel media are distinguished from
traditional art forms in their unmediated presentation, which facilitates
them being viewed as threatening to certain audiences. When Marina
Abramovic stares at us in the MoMA we sense her aesthetic aura and
recognize it as a curated experience.16 It is not simply “staring” in the
mundane sense; rather the preternatural ability of Abramovic
transforms this otherwise quotidian event into an artful experience. It
does not feel threatening. Still, it is an experience that challenges the
epistemological limits of human language: how to articulate in words
what makes Abramovic’s elevated form of staring different from our
own?What if I recorded a video of me staring into my iPhone camera
lens and uploaded it to YouTube and captioned it as “art”? Would my
saying, “It’s art” make it so? Or what if I uploaded a selfie video in
which I blithely repeat the line “I will kill the person I don’t like,” and
refer to it as a “rap” in the thumbnail? Has it become a rap? There
might not be an articulable way to distinguish my seemingly literal
threat from a similar lyric by an established rapper. We can cite to the
musicality and flow of the actual rapper, and we can contextualize the
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1787–1800 (2004) (considering
“the magnetism of the First Amendment”).
13. 566 N.E.2d 207 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1990).
14. See Alex Palmer, When Art Fought the Law and the Art Won, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct.
2,
2015),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/when-art-fought-law-and-art-won-1809
56810/.
15. Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 1 (2008).
16. See, e.g., Michael Zhang, Sitting, Staring, and Crying with Marina Abramovi at MoMa,
PETAPIXEL (Apr. 23, 2010), https://petapixel.com/2010/04/23/sitting-staring-and-crying-withmarina-abramovic-at-moma/ (explaining that visitors sit and stare back at Abramovic for long
periods of time, and many are in fact moved to tears).
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line as a layer in the song’s sonic texture. Still, these are distinctions
separate from the surface language of the line in itself: “I will kill the
person I don’t like.”
The First Amendment treats a professional rap differently than my
amateur attempt. But this incongruous treatment is problematic
because it requires an implicit qualitative judgment of when a rap is
artful. This paper builds on the work of Jed Rubenfeld17 and Genevieve
Lakier,18 who have deconstructed the conceptual integrity of highvalue and low-value speech in First Amendment doctrine.19 Because
certain categories of speech are seen as low-value (such as inciting or
threatening speech), it is easier to make content-based judgments
about the kinds of speech that can be lawfully regulated. We might not
often think about true threats doctrine explicitly in these terms, but a
statute that criminalizes threatening speech is equivalent to a form of
content-based discrimination in which the government favors nonthreatening speech over threatening speech.
These content-based restrictions are informed by broader cultural
intuitions of what the First Amendment is meant to cover. In realist
terms, it covers what we, as a legal culture, think it should. This explains
why the First Amendment has been interpreted to protect not just core
speech rights like political speech, but also the art speech of Jackson
Pollock and Lewis Carroll. For example, in Kleinman v. City of San
Marcos, the Fifth Circuit held that the First Amendment covers only
great art.20 The First Amendment makes quality distinctions. Courts
used to be able to rely on institutional gatekeepers to discern them.
By definition, user-generated internet content bypasses the quality
control work of Art World gatekeepers.21 Here, I focus on the precise
17. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 823 (2001) (“The
freedom of speech, as we actually know it and have it in this country, is irreconcilable with highvalue/low-value thinking.”).
18. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2168
(2015) (introducing a theory that First Amendment protections only minimally extend to lowvalue speech).
19. By “modern First Amendment doctrine,” I refer to the First Amendment as interpreted
after Justice Holmes’ iconic dissent in Abrams v. United States, which urged restraint in
suppressing free speech unless that speech presents an imminent danger. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256,
1278 n.97 (2005) (suggesting that the prevailing view among academics—that Schauer himself
does not support—is that “the First Amendment started in 1919” when the Abrams opinion was
written).
20. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 2010).
21. Prior scholarship has identified the gatekeeper problem in the context of fake news or
defamatory or hostile speech. See, e.g., Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan:
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issue of who makes threshold decisions about whether something is art
at all. When does the amateur attempt at making a work of art—like a
rap song—become “art speech” for constitutional purposes? This has
direct implications for First Amendment blackletter doctrine which
assumes that if something qualifies as “art,” it cannot simultaneously
be a true threat.
My central claim is that the Art World’s threshold decision to
present an artwork or publish a music album effectively insulates the
work from a true threats analysis because courts have deferred to the
aesthetic judgment of these institutional gatekeepers. Courts did not
need to cite to these “authorities” in their opinions because the
assumption that professional art could not be threatening was so
pervasive. But with the advent of the internet, courts must now grapple
with the reality of true threats in rap form.
In the last five years, the Supreme Court has been asked three times
to resolve the question of rap threats but has avoided directly
confronting the issue each time. In Elonis v. United States, defendant
Anthony Elonis posted to Facebook violent rap lyrics that seemed to
threaten his wife and a federal investigator. Chief Justice Roberts
retreated from the question of whether the aesthetic quality of the rap
lyrics might be relevant to a threats analysis, and instead decided the
case based on the defendant’s subjective intent.22 In Bell v. Itawamba
County School Board, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for a case
in which a high school student was suspended for a violent rap about
his two gym teachers who were accused of lewd behavior.23 And in
2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for Knox v. Pennsylvania, in
which an amateur rapper argued that his violent lyrics should have
been interpreted non-literally, even though he referred by name to the
law enforcement officers who had arrested him.24

Public Figures and Newsworthiness in Online Speech, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 37, 76 (2019) (“In the
new speech ecosystem brought about in part by platforms like Facebook, people can be thrust
into the public sphere and bypass the gatekeeping function of the traditional press.”); Erin
Carroll, Making News: Balancing Newsworthiness and Privacy in the Age of Algorithms, 106 GEO.
L.J. 69, 71 (2017) (“As the role of information gatekeeper starts to pass from journalists at legacy
news organizations to engineers, coders, and designers, the very nature of the Fourth Estate and
the news it produces is changing.”).
22. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2022 (2015).
23. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166
(2016).
24. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), cert denied sub nom. Knox v.
Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
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Knox v. Pennsylvania inspired this paper on the relationship
between aesthetic quality and First Amendment coverage. The core
question for courts in cases like Knox is “When should seemingly literal
speech acts be interpreted non-literally?” Prior to the internet, we
implicitly assumed that certain kinds of non-literal speech or expressive
acts were “art” and thus endowed with constitutional protection. This
paper explains how we have traditionally deferred to the judgment of
institutional gatekeepers to make these threshold decisions of what
counts as art in the First Amendment context. But because the internet
has progressively eroded the role of these gatekeepers, this question is
all the more urgent for courts to answer. A well-intentioned (but
confused) law and rap academic community (a mix of legal scholars,
sociologists, criminologists and pedigree rappers) argues for blanket
First Amendment coverage of rap lyrics and their insulation from use
as courtroom evidence.25 However, this is not how the First
Amendment is meant to work.26 I expand on the coverage-protection
distinction to explain how the First Amendment art speech doctrine
should apply to rap music, and argue for coverage of rap lyrics based
on the quality of the rap or rapper, or on membership in a sort of rap
guild. Unfortunately, rap is a shape-shifting genre that defies easy
categorization, and one that depends on fickle notions of reputation
and public perception. Rap has also been traditionally characterized as
a transgressive art form, so conditioning First Amendment coverage on
group membership might be inconsistent with the very ethos of this
musical form.
In this Article, I analyze how internet rap raises foundational
problems in how the First Amendment regime distinguishes speech
acts. I review recent cases concerning rap lyrics, like the Supreme
Court’s decision in Elonis v. United States, to suggest how we should
think about separate categories of art speech and political speech. This
raises difficult questions about First Amendment coverage: How do we
25. See, e.g., Erik Nielson, ‘Rap on Trial’: Why Lyrics Should Be Off-Limits, ROLLING
STONE (May 3, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/rap-on-trial-why-lyricsshould-be-off-limits-116368/ (describing the use of rap lyrics as evidence).
26. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1161 (“More generally, if this Court were to rule that Appellant’s
decision to use a stage persona and couch his threatening speech as ‘gangsta rap’ categorically
prevented the song from being construed as an expression of a genuine intent to inflict harm, we
would in effect be interpreting the Constitution to provide blanket protection for threats, however
severe, so long as they are expressed within that musical style. We are not aware of any First
Amendment doctrine that insulates an entire genre of communication from a legislative
determination that certain types of harms should be regulated in the interest of public safety,
health, and welfare.”).
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define the boundaries of “art speech” when perceptions of artfulness—
especially in the context of abstract or otherwise meaning-resistant art
works—had previously been based on the critical reception of our
institutional gatekeepers? I consider how either civil society or the
state can mirror the essential quality control work done by prior Art
World actors so that we can maintain the integrity of the First
Amendment regime while providing a space for amateur artists to
experiment with provocative ways of expressing themselves.
II. WHAT ART IS AND WHAT ART DOES
Rap is evaluated by audiences comparably to other gestalt art forms
like pop art,27 given its referential nature. The pop art movement
inspired Arthur Danto to unpack how material objects are transformed
into “art,” based on the work’s institutional context, and by how the
Art World presents and values it.28 For example, Warhol’s iconic
Campbell’s Soup Cans depicts a seemingly mundane subject. But the
iterated presentation of the Warhol imagery inspires a deeper sort of
mentation among viewers that allows for playful critique of notions of
art and advertisement. The Art World viewed it as transformative.29
Still, it might be impossible for the viewer to articulate what, if
anything, distinguishes the surface quality of the Warhol painting from
that of the original consumer product.
Rap shares this same core dilemma. I make the descriptive claim in
this paper that we evaluate the quality of a rap track based on its sonic
impact. Although lyrics help to shape the texture of a song and contour
the listener experience, it is wrong to equate song lyrics with written
poetry.30 Rap lyrics do not serve the same function as written poetry,
and rap—like any form of music—is not foremost a literary art.
Nevertheless, judges typically read rap lyrics in isolation when they
engage in a true threats analysis. This is problematic because no
interpreter, whether a court or a music critic, can answer the threshold

27. See pop art, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/pop%20art (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) (defining pop art as “art in which
commonplace objects (such as road signs, hamburgers, comic strips, or soup cans) are used as
subject matter and are often physically incorporated in the work”).
28. Arthur Danto, The End of Art: A Philosophical Defense, 37 HIST. & THEORY 127, 128
(1998).
29. Id. at 141 (observing the paradigm-shifting impact of Warhol’s art).
(Aug.
7,
2019,
7:42
PM),
30. See,
e.g.,
@sad13,
TWITTER
https://twitter.com/sad13/status/1159248479694147584 (referring to David Berman from Silver
Jews when she tweeted “songwriting is NOT poetry, it’s crazy one person was so good at both”).
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art speech question of whether a rap is good by thinking about lyrical
meaning divorced from a rap track’s sonic experience. Indeed, the
brilliant rap and the genuinely awful attempt at rap might each be read
as wooden and mundane on their own, making it impossible for a judge
to discern what, if anything, makes rap “art.”31 The transcribed lyric
sheet of both the brilliant rap and the awful attempt at rap may “look”
the same to a reader, to the extent that neither reads as literary or artful.
We only know if a rap is good, or even a rap at all, by listening to it.
Rap lyrics, like most song lyrics, are better understood as
vocalizations that comprise only part of a broader experience—that is,
the song. And so, like most song lyrics, these vocalizations might be
nonsensical or improvised and may not necessarily be intended to
convey meaning. For this reason, the majority of rap lyrics should be
interpreted as non-literal. The industry’s transition to “ambient” and
“mumble” rap exemplifies why: These rap genres emphasize sonic
atmosphere over intelligibility. We now focus less on what rappers say,
and more on how they sound.32
For example, Tyler the Creator, the 2020 Grammy award winner for
Best Rap Album, has argued for a deeper interpretation of his own
lyrics, lamenting that “most people just read the surface.”33 An age-old
adage cautions against judging books by their covers, but what does it
mean to look beyond the surface of a spoken word? It is unusual to
think of spoken language as a mere vehicle for some alternative or
hidden meaning, or, in some cases, a lack of meaning.
Although this paper will not attempt define what art is, it accounts
for how the label of “art” affects First Amendment analysis:
Categorizing speech as “art” (1) makes it potentially non-literal and (2)
renders it culturally significant, and thus worthy of First Amendment
protection.34 After Joseph Frederick unveiled his “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” banner at a 2002 Olympic Torch relay, the Court deemed it

31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Kathy Iandoli, The Rise of ‘Mumble Rap’: Did Lyricism Take a Hit in 2016?,
BILLBOARD (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/hip-hop/7625631/riseof-mumble-rap-lyricism-2016 (describing the mystique of rap where lyrics are nearly
incomprehensible to the lay listener).
33. Tyler, the Creator Reveals Range of Anti-Homophobia Merchandise, NME (May 8,
2015), http://www.nme.com/news/tyler-the-creator—3/85233 (quoting Tyler the Creator as
saying, “I’m legit one of the least homophobic guys to walk this earth but most people just read
the surface”).
34. See Post, supra note 6, at 1256 (Post constructs his own graphical table of how
communication medium and First Amendment interests intersect).
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nonsense of the mundane kind.35 But if he had directly quoted Lewis
Carroll’s work, for example, nonsensical as it is, perhaps the same
banner would have then been interpreted as art, and thus protected by
the First Amendment.
Although Lewis Carroll’s stories have been read against opium
culture,36 he never argued for drug use in public schools or made direct
threats of violence in his works. Indeed, the contained universe of most
any fictional literary work makes it difficult for a novel’s narrative
depiction of violence to feel like a genuine threat to a living person.
This prosaic fact informs our collective sense of why “it [was] hard to
imagine art speech constituting incitement, threats or fighting words.”37
In “Rap on Trial,” the foundational 2014 paper on the use of rap
lyrics in American courts, Professors Charis Kubrin and Erik Nielson
recorded the notable example of an amateur attempt at rap being
charged as a threat.38 The authors also cited to how professional rapper
Lil Boosie’s (now Boosie Badazz) lyrics were entered in evidence for a
separate murder charge.39 Still, there is an essential distinction between
a published rap lyric being used as evidence of motive or confession
and a rap song being criminalized as a threat in itself. The First
Amendment is only relevant to the latter issue of art threats. I don’t
know of any cases in which a published rap lyric by a professional
rapper has itself been criminalized as a threat.
III. THE ART WORLD AS GATEKEEPER
Our First Amendment regime developed in a market of scarce
public speech. There has historically been a limited supply of
newspapers and broadcasting outlets, and courts broadly deferred to
news publishers’ judgments as to whether a news bit was relevant or
significant.40 These threshold choices about “newsworthiness” (i.e.,
35. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 402 (2007).
36. Is Alice in Wonderland Really About Drugs?, BBC (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.bbc.
com/ news/magazine-19254839.
37. Eberle, supra note 15, at 25.
38. Charis E. Kubrin & Erik Nielson, Rap on Trial, 4 RACE & JUST. 185, 193–94 (2014)
(discussing “the case against Olutosin Oduwole, a Black student at Southern Illinois University,
whose rap lyrics alone were viewed as such a danger to the public that he was charged with
attempting to make a terrorist threat” which “was so unsettling in its blatant criminalization of
rap lyrics that it independently drew the attention of both authors and became the catalyst for
their subsequent collaboration in this article”).
39. Id. at 186.
40. Kadri & Klonick, supra note 21, at 54 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
496–97 (1975) in which the Court emphasized that “the reliance must rest upon the judgment of
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what counts as news) determined who qualified as a “public figure” in
defamation suits.41 This analysis is obviously complicated in our new
internet world of Twitter and Facebook.
Similar, courts relied on the Art World to manage the boundaries
of “art speech.” Prior to the internet, gallery owners, museum curators,
record label execs, literary agents, Hollywood producers and film
festival committees exercised broad control in deciding which artists
were seen or heard. With the internet, these barriers to entry have
eroded. Now the novice or the untalented can upload their attempts at
art directly to the internet for unlimited, and perhaps permanent,
distribution. The internet has democratized access to distribution
channels for talented artists who otherwise lack the resources or
connections to break through to a commercial market. This is a very
good thing.
On the other hand, threshold determinations of artfulness made by
Art World gatekeepers once directly informed whether a given work
or expressive act may be scrutinized as a threat. This quality control
work is no longer done. The Supreme Court has avoided the issue of
art threats, as seen most recently in the denial of certiorari in Knox v.
Pennsylvania.42 But the problem of how to distinguish artful “good”
rap from non-rap still lurks.43 Are courts avoiding this problem because
they do not recognize it as a proper constitutional question, or because
they recognize that other social institutions are better positioned to
manage this culture-inflected issue? This is a profound question
considering the prior quasi-legal work done by Art World gatekeepers.
When the Art World made these sorts of threshold judgments, it
effectively determined which speech or expressive acts were covered
by the First Amendment. If the Art World validates a contested speech
act as aesthetic, then it cannot be seen as threatening. Conversely, a
speech act that is cognizable as a personalized threat cannot
simultaneously possess aesthetic intent. For First Amendment doctrine,

those who decide what to publish or broadcast.”).
41. Id. at 42–51 (describing how defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress substantiate tort claims rooted in the First Amendment).
42. 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
43. See generally Andrew J. Kerr, Aesthetic Play and Bad Intent, 103 MINN. L. REV:
HEADNOTES 83 (2018) (detailing various problems with making judicial inferences from rap
lyrics, including discerning intent of lyrics, what constitutes “art” and what is non-performative,
etc.).
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this distinction is binary. Either there is violent intent behind what you
say, or there is aesthetic intent, but there cannot be both.44
Doctrinally, a true threat is not even regarded as a speech act for
First Amendment purposes, which is why violent intent and aesthetic
intent are mutually exclusive. A true threat puts the listener in danger
of life and limb, and thus it is not protected speech. Rather, the threat
isn’t really speech in the First Amendment sense of the word at all. It’s
criminalized as the verbal manifestation of a violent physical threat.
The complication with this binary regime is that it ignores the
reality that many speech acts have blended intent. A rapper—like many
artists—might first be inspired to write a song out of emotions like
anger or rage. Many artists might harbor bad intent at some point in
their creative process. But professional artists are also socialized to an
Art World in which audiences expect a piece to stand on its own, to be
a thing unto itself. This generic posture is not very difficult to achieve
for a visual artist. When art doesn’t use words, it’s hard for any single
audience member to assume a violence-tinged piece is aimed at them—
for example, the recent gun-centric installations of celebrated sculptor
Michael Murphy.45
Musicians of course use words as part of the aesthetic materials that
contribute to the construction of their songs. I acknowledge that many
musicians want their words to convey meaning. Even so, it is rare for
song lyrics to be heard as a personalized threat to a unique audience
member. The singer-songwriter tradition relies on the anonymized
“you” (or perhaps a substitute name like Layla46) when describing a
real muse. The identity of a past lover is made opaque and general by
substituting a pronoun for that person’s name. Any of us could be this
“you” if we wish to be, but none of us must be this “you” (or have to
admit to being the “you”)47 if the lyricist derides the song’s object. The

44. See Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First Amendment
Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (2006) (describing the “threat exception” as statements
that do not express intent to inflict harm); see also Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the
First Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 593 (2000) (“The standard for
regulating threats should reflect this underlying assumption that true threats are something other
than constitutionally protected speech, and the converse assumption that expression containing
threatening language that is predominantly intended to communicate ideas or viewpoints is
constitutionally protected speech.”).
45. E.g., Alice Yoo, 130 Suspended Toy Guns Form a Map of the USA, MYMODERNMET
(Oct. 1, 2014), https://mymodernmet.com/michael-murphy-gun-country/.
46. The Real ‘Layla’ Talks About George Harrison and Eric Clapton, ABC NEWS (Dec. 20,
2007), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/SummerConcert/story?id=3546199&page=1.
47. Cf. Elyse Dupre, Alanis Morissette Addresses Rumors “You Oughta Know” Is About Ex
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de-contextualization of the typical song lyric gives it a universal aspect
that facilitates connection with and among listeners.
However, much of contemporary rap comes from a storytelling
tradition in which the rapper interweaves narrative description with
structural moves like repetition or outro commentary.48 This narrative
might rely on elements of an artist’s personal and collective
experiences, and it occasionally might include graphic description of
the rapper’s fantasies. Notable instances of the seemingly literal rap
threat are heard in popular songs like Tupac Shakur’s “Hit ‘Em Up”49
(disclaiming that “this ain’t no freestyle battle”50 prior to lyrically
attacking Biggie Smalls and other rivals) as well as Eminem’s repeated
violent references to his ex-wife Kim Mathers in peak-career albums
like The Slim Shady LP and The Marshall Mathers LP.51 This kind of
violence-tinged storytelling is not exclusive to rap: Bob Dylan appeared
to fantasize about the death of General McNamara in “Masters of
War.”52
Still, Tupac, Eminem, and Bob Dylan are each considered frontrank in their respective genres. Threshold quality control decisions to
produce and distribute their music inform the law’s treatment of their
potentially threatening lyrics. These are “easy cases” to the extent that
they are disposed of prior to litigation. But what if we were not able to
delegate this work of scrutinizing aesthetic intent to institutional
gatekeepers?53 Here the Art World was effectively tasked with a true
threats analysis to determine whether the aesthetic value of these
Tupac or Eminem tracks outweighed the potentially threatening nature
Dave Coulier, EONLINE (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.eonline.com/news/1100258/alanismorissette-addresses-rumors-you-oughta-know-is-about-ex-dave-coulier (describing the subject
of Alanis Morisette’s “You Oughta Know”).
48. The outro of Kendrick Lamar’s song “m.A.A.d. city” provides an excellent example, in
which the listener can hear a conversation between two men. SEE KENDRICK LAMAR, M.A.A.D.
CITY (Interscope Records 2012).
49. Stereo Williams, Tupac’s ‘Hit ‘Em Up’: The Most Savage Diss Track Ever Turns 20, THE
DAILY BEAST (July 12, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/tupacs-hit-em-up-the-most-savagediss-track-ever-turns-20.
50. Hit ‘Em Up (2Pac), GENIUS.COM, https://genius.com/2pac-hit-em-up-lyrics (last visited
February 20, 2021).
51. E.g., Kim (song), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_(song) (last visited
February 20, 2021).
52. See Tom Robbins, Robert S. McNamara: Master of War, THE VILLAGE VOICE (July 7,
2009), https://www.villagevoice.com/2009/07/07/robert-s-mcnamara-master-of-war/ (noting that
“Bob Dylan urged [people] to stand over McNamara’s grave . . . .”).
53. See generally Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985) (explaining
that exploring “easy cases” in the law tell us something about the harder cases, and what make
them hard).
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of their lyrics. This is a nexus of the Watts factors of context, content
and audience reception. The Art World can rightly think of itself as the
intended audience for a rap. It also possesses the expertise to make
evaluative decisions about content. And once the Art World has made
this threshold quality control decision as to artfulness, legal actors can
defer to the context of an economic market for these albums54 and trust
that a minimum level of aesthetic intent went into their creation. We
acknowledge that there is blended aesthetic/bad intent in the
construction of some songs that enter our musical canon. Courts rely
on the evaluations of market actors both (1) to dispose of these factladen analyses and (2) to maintain the conceptual integrity of a
freedom of speech doctrine that is forced to distinguish art from threat.
IV. WHAT COUNTS AS A RAP?
I do not attempt to resolve the perennial philosophical debate
surrounding aesthetic intent in this paper.55 The creative process
necessarily involves some degree of serendipity. Artists themselves
might not be able to discern the motivations behind their own artwork
or song lyric. Rappers rely on a kind of muscle memory that allows
them to riff on tropes in the corpus and layer the internal meaning of
their songs. They are acculturated to the “language game” of rap, in
which they both internalize the conventions of the genre, and also press
on these same rules and boundaries to distinguish their own flow and
lend an element of improvisation and surprise.56 They search for the
novel gesture that feels effortless. You don’t win the #rapgame by trying
too hard, or by telling the listener that you are a real rapper and rapping
a rap about what you will do to the listener. That will not fly today – it
is an amateur attempt to play the game by including some overt
signposts to a dated form of the genre.
The problem for the law and rap community is that, generally, the
literality of rap lyrics is inversely related to the quality of the song. It is
54. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903) (famously discerning
commercial value as an index of artistic progress).
55. Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 423 (2017) (“Answering
that question by reference to the intentions of the work’s creator makes sense only if one adopts
a substantive, and deeply contested, view about how intentions, meaning, and value interact in
the context of art.”). Soucek generally refers to PAISLEY LIVINGSTON, ART AND INTENTION: A
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (2005).
56. See Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech, in FREE SPEECH BEYOND
WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 116–18 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds.,
2017) (introducing the Wittgensteinian concept of a language game in the context of nonsense
speech).
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almost always the novice who chooses to rap with such specificity that
his lyric could be perceived as a personalized threat. The best rappers
(at least since Tupac and Eminem) simply do not rap like this much
anymore. Kendrick Lamar’s Good Kid M.A.A.D. City (2012) is a
remarkable album that creates a cinematic experience for the listener.
Its violent references are retrospective and internal to the narrative
logic of the album. It does not speak directly to a present listener. Most
popular rappers aim to create an atmosphere or make critical
commentary rather than to make individualized statements about a
particular listener. Insular references appeal to fewer people, and thus
engage only a limited audience. Real rappers perform for a generalized
audience.
The relationship between quality and literality frames the recent
line of cases submitted to the Supreme Court (Elonis, Bell, Knox). In
each of these cases the posted or rapped lyric is so specific in its object
that it could threaten an intended audience member. It is also unclear
whether these attempted raps meet the threshold evaluative standard
of rap-as-art.
A. Elonis v. United States: Do Elonis’s posts count as “raps”?
Elonis v. United States was the first rap threat case reviewed by the
Supreme Court.57 In this case, Anthony Elonis had uploaded to his
Facebook page lyrics that made direct reference to actual events in his
personal life and described violent acts toward his soon-to-be ex-wife
and a federal investigator.58 For example, after a state judge granted
Elonis’s wife a three-year restraining order, Elonis wrote, “Fold up your
[protection-from-abuse order] and put it in your pocket/ Is it thick
enough to stop a bullet?”59 After a female FBI agent visited his home,
Elonis wrote
You know your s***’s ridiculous
when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door
Little Agent lady stood so close
Took all the strength I had not to turn the b**** ghost
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat

57. Pierce, infra note 95, at 52.
58. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005–06 (2015).
59. Id. at 2006.
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Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms of her partner.60

These shared posts were only written (Elonis had never actually
recorded the rap) and their coarse directness makes them feel like
Elonis’ violent intentions were literal. Their lack of artfulness explains
why we receive them as threatening.
The Third Circuit noted that Elonis had little personal history of
rapping.61 Chief Justice Roberts also questioned the aesthetic value of
Elonis’s raps.62 Roberts employed the interesting use of quotation
when referring to Elonis’s Facebook posts, observing that after Elonis’
wife left him he began “posting self-styled ‘rap’ lyrics.”63 It is unclear
whether Roberts is merely quoting from the record or if he is
expressing skepticism about whether Elonis’s lyrics merit the aesthetic
label of “rap.” But even if Elonis’s words feel crude and boorish, they
are also inflected with tropes common to rap and parody music. Elonis
even assumes an alternative moniker “Tone Dougie” and disclaims that
his lyrics are “fictitious” and bear no “intentional resemblance to real
persons.”64 His posts include meta-commentary on the nature of his
posting: “Me thinks the Judge needs an education/ on true threat
jurisprudence.”65 He tells his readership that, although his lyrics are
publicly shared, they are “[F]or me. My writing is therapeutic.”66 This is
certainly a plausible reading, and it is true that many people over-share
personal thoughts on the internet.
Chief Justice Roberts avoided the precise question of whether these
posts were sufficiently artful to be recognized as raps. Instead, the
Court read a scienter requirement into the true threats analysis and
held that because of Elonis’s direct references to the fictitious and
cathartic nature of these raps, he did not possess the necessary mens rea
to make a true threat with these posts.67 We can read this avoidance of
a discussion on artfulness as reflecting a broader concern about the
conceptual integrity of the true threats doctrine. If Roberts described
the lyrics as art or actual raps, we might question his judgment. If

60. Id.
61. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Ms. Elonis further testified
that Elonis rarely listened to rap music, and that she had never seen Elonis write rap lyrics during
their seven years of marriage.”).
62. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004 (calling Elonis’s post “self-styled ‘rap’ lyrics).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2005.
65. Id. at 2006.
66. Id. at 2005.
67. Id. at 2012.
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Roberts derided them as non-art, it would be difficult for him to tell
Elonis’ ex-wife or investigating agent that they should interpret his
statements non-literally.
In dissent, however, Justice Alito dismissed the cathartic value of a
potentially threatening post. He also questioned if the aesthetic
intention of a posted lyric necessarily shields it from true threats
analysis, worrying that this rule “would grant a license to anyone who
is clever enough to dress up a real threat in the guise of rap lyrics, a
parody, or something similar.”68
V. ART AS COVER? OR COVERING ART?
Implicit in Justice Alito’s analysis is the concern that a badintentioned speaker can simply declare her own speech as “art” and
receive First Amendment coverage. That by pretextually checking off
certain signifiers of rap, an ill-intentioned speaker can self-create the
magic legal status of “art speech” and shield her actually threatening
speech from a true threats analysis. There is a dangerous alchemy here.
A private actor can marshal the force of the law simply by inserting
some slangy language or making familiar references. This conflicts with
our core constitutional principle that we cannot “permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself” by empowering him to determine that
his own speech act receives special constitutional protection.69 It just
cannot be this easy to avoid criminal sanctions when the harm remains
the same.
This echoes the argument about barriers to entry and the gestalt
nature of contemporary art. We share an expectation of the time and
effort that goes into a novel, the instrumentation that goes into a rock
album, or the vocal refinement that makes a song R&B. But rap (along
with performance art and pop art) relies on a gestalt sense of quality
that is internal to those in the community. Critics and record label
executives decide what counts as rap and who does it well. It might not
matter much if I scribble a Campbell’s Soup can and declare it “art,”
because it is no threat to safety. But if I parrot the cadence and word
usage of a popular rap song in a threatening diatribe, I can potentially
be covered by the First Amendment and thus endowed with certain
positive entitlements against the state and other individuals. Rap music
is not easy to fake, but rap lyrics might be.
68. Id.
69. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
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The literal interpretation of “speech” as including only spoken
language feels under-inclusive. We assume that text, or written work, is
covered, too. The Supreme Court has also expanded “speech” to refer
to other sorts of speech-like or expressive kinds of conduct. Notably,
in Citizens United v. FEC, we were reminded that corporations speak
through their spending.70 We also speak when we wear a black armband
in school,71 when we tape a peace sign to an American flag,72 when we
make decisions about who may or may not march in a parade,73 and
even when we design a wedding cake (but, importantly, only if it is a
beautiful wedding cake).74 What is the doctrinal boundary for this kind
of expressive conduct? The First Amendment cannot cover all of the
ways we express ourselves. Jed Rubenfeld hypothesized how breaking
the speed limit could be a profound form of expression for the sports
car-loving libertarian.75 Still, a judge would certainly toss out a First
Amendment defense to a speeding ticket as frivolous.
Discerning the boundaries of the First Amendment requires
identifying the usual constitutional two-step framework for deciding
whether a government action comports with the Constitution.76 First,
we look to the Constitution to check off if a certain kind of action is
covered by its text (e.g., if a particular class of government
investigations counts as a “search” or “seizure” per the Fourth
Amendment, such as rifling through your glove compartment). Only
then do we ask whether a specific search is protected, given our
standards of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
This threshold question is commonly ignored in First Amendment
analysis, in part because of the vagueness issue identified above.
70. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 346–47 (2010) (holding that, under the First
Amendment, funding of political broadcasts cannot be limited based on the corporate identity of
the speaker).
71. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (holding
that wearing of armbands to communicate a certain view is “akin to ‘pure speech’” and is entitled
to First Amendment protection).
72. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406–07 (1974) (holding a Washington state law
that prohibited appellant from displaying an American flag affixed with a black peace symbol
impermissibly infringed on appellant’s First Amendment right to expression).
73. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)
(holding, under the First Amendment, the state may not compel private citizens organizing a
public demonstration to include groups with a message antithetical to the organizer’s message).
74. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018)
(“The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons who have seen a beautiful
wedding cake might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech.”).
75. Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 772–75.
76. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 267–82 (introducing the coverage question).
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“Seizure” is fairly precise word77; “speech” is not. It is so difficult to
chart the boundaries of constitutional speech that most would rather
assume coverage than define where the exact boundaries of speech
coverage are.
In part, this reflects our assumptions about the institutional context
of public communication, and how formal vetting channels like
publishers or curators used to make threshold decisions about aesthetic
quality. We could fairly ignore the coverage question concerning “art
speech” because the Art World already managed it. The coverage
question was outsourced.
The law and rap community is certainly not unique in conflating
coverage questions about art speech with normative questions about
courtroom use of rap lyrics. Scholars have produced important
academic research on the overuse of rap in courtroom litigation.
Professors Andrea Dennis and Erik Nielson’s recent Rap on Trial is a
comprehensive look at the unwise, and sometimes unscrupulous, ways
that prosecutors have entered drafted lyrics or recorded rap songs as
courtroom evidence: as a confession of having committed a crime, or as
demonstrating a motive to commit a crime.78 There are two problems
here. First, rap should only rarely be used in court, considering its weak
probative value. Second, if it is going to be used, we shouldn’t be underinclusive. Singling out rap as a criminalized musical genre has obvious
racial implications given the strong associations between rap and Black
culture.
The use of rap as evidence is an important socio-legal problem, but
it is not a First Amendment problem. In short, the First Amendment
does not cover evidence law—as legal doctrines, they exist in separate
spheres.79 The First Amendment does not insulate either non-literal or
artful speech from courtroom use. Privilege exceptions are made in
evidence law for things like doctor-patient or spousal communication
because we value trust and candor in these specified relationships. But
First Amendment values are mostly irrelevant to evidence law. If I write
and publish a song about killing a man in Reno “just to watch him die,”
77. Schauer, supra note 12, at 1772–73 (explaining the coverage question in the context of
the Fourth Amendment is determined by the scope of the “comparatively clear” word “seizure”).
78. Erik Nielson & Andrea L. Dennis, Rap on Trial, BOS. REV. (Nov. 8, 2019),
http://bostonreview.net/arts-society/erik-nielson-andrea-l-dennis-rap-trial.
79. Schauer, supra note 12, at 1783–84 (“Less visibly still, much the same degree of First
Amendment irrelevance holds true for the content-based regulation of . . . virtually the entirety of
the law of evidence . . . and that vast domain of criminal law that deals with conspiracy and criminal
solicitation.”) (emphasis added).
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and then a corpse is discovered near my hotel during my documented
stay there, then my lyric can surely be entered as evidence to my motive
or as a confession.80 It doesn’t matter if my song is rollicking or
penetrating or chart-topping. Its Art World status is independent to its
status as potential courtroom evidence. Of course, my own defense
attorneys would contest the lyric’s probative value by suggesting it is
pure fiction that merely reflects my broader oeuvre as a singersongwriter. A jury could then weigh these competing considerations as
to the sincerity of my song and its status as a genuine confession. We
don’t like having to specify with nicety if or how much art represents
reality, and so we delegate this difficult, perhaps un-articulable, decision
to the factfinder.
What the law and rap communities seem to confuse here is how the
First Amendment treats art speech in a true threats analysis as
compared to in the evidentiary context. The Johnny Cash song “Folsom
Prison Blues” is surely covered as art speech by the First Amendment.
It is validated by the Art World and has been received by fans and
critics as a wonderful example of song craft. Ex ante, we allow this
speech act to be part of our public sphere because it does not strike fear
in any particular listener. The reference to a Reno murder is internal to
the song’s narrative logic. Ex post, we might discover that this lyric was
confessional of an actual killing. But it retains its First Amendment
coverage even if it is later marshaled as evidence. This speech act does
not target anyone today.
Doctrinally these are separate issues. True threats doctrine presents
the First Amendment problem of whether a potentially threatening
speech act can be vocalized at all. It frames whether the speech act may
be part of the public sphere, or if it can instead be criminalized. The
non-literal nature of attempted rap lyrics is generally sufficient to put
prosecutors or judges on notice of the weak probative value of rap as
evidence. But a song or rap must also be good for the First Amendment
to protect the potentially threatening lyric as art speech from a true
threats analysis.

80. But see the amicus brief submitted by ACLU of New Jersey in Skinner v. New Jersey
Dept. of Corrections, 2016 WL 3063727, at *3 (2013) (suggesting that Johnny Cash’s “Folsom
Prison Blues” should not even be admitted as evidence of motive and intent), https://www.aclunj.org/cases/state-v-skinner.
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VI. RAP IN POLITICAL AND AESTHETIC CONTEXT
The most recent rap case petitioned for Supreme Court review,
Knox v. Pennsylvania, can be unpacked as both a political speech case
and as an art speech case. Before analyzing the precise lyrical issue
prompted in Knox, I first contextualize this case within the framing
moves made by the law and rap community in the form of repeat
amicus briefs. In each of Elonis, Bell, and Knox the law and rap
community submitted amicus briefs in support of the aspiring rapper
facing a true threats prosecution or school suspension.81 Despite some
stylistic distinctions in these briefs, they make broadly similar
arguments. The main points are echoed by amicus submissions from kin
advocacy groups and art scholars in these cases.
In general, these briefs illuminate a cultural history of rap that
informs a non-literal interpretation of rap lyrics. They examine ‘70s and
‘80s street culture, as well as the contemporary political and social
unrest, which, taken together, gave rise to rap as a music genre. Each
refers to examples of important songs from the rap corpus in which the
artist uses violence for aesthetic effect or to sublimate their own
aggression. The briefs identify general characteristics common across
the genre of rap music, including typical lyrical moves made by rappers,
to demonstrate how these genre expectations provide a model or
template for the aspiring rapper. The argument is that influential artists
have rapped in often seemingly violent or threatening ways, and as an
aesthetic community, we have interpreted them non-literally. So, when
aspiring rappers make the same lyrical moves, we should interpret
these amateur attempts the same way: non-literally. These would-be
rappers are simply participating in an aesthetic discourse.
These briefs are essential for two reasons: (1) They situate an
unfamiliar reader/listener like a judge for this particular kind of speech
act, and (2) they suggest the political nature of rap. There is value in
detailing this kind of unspoken context for rap music. Rappers
participate in a language game with an internal set of rules that are
known to fans and critics. An individual rapper can assume that if

81. See Brief for Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 2–3, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); see also Brief for
Erik Nielson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3–4, Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd,
799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Michael Render (“Killer Mike”), Erik Nielson, and Other Artists and Scholars in Support of
Petitioner at 2–3, Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox
v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
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someone purchases their album or streams their song, listeners are
already acculturated to the conventions of the genre and will interpret
the lyrical moves against this implied context. However, when a rap is
heard—or worse, read—by a court unfamiliar with this background
context, then the individual judge is unable to construct legible
meaning of a contested lyric. These amicus briefs provide the Supreme
Court with a sort of playbook—familiarizing judges, who largely came
of age before the advent and mainstreaming of rap in America, with the
genre’s familiar patterns.
These amicus briefs also play a critical role in explaining how rap
often bleeds into political speech. In doing so, they expand our
collective conception of what political speech encompasses and thus,
what speech is protected by the First Amendment. Political speech is
core to the First Amendment. We protect it because vibrant dissent is
necessary to democratic self-government and our education as
citizens.82 Political speech can take many shapes. Quintessentially, it’s
the flyer of the pamphleteer, the speech of the soapbox contrarian or
an op-ed in your local newspaper. But what these amicus briefs
emphasize is that rap is founded on political subtext—a common
example is rap’s critique of police. Rap, much like your typical political
speech, functions as a First Amendment “safety valve,” allowing
rappers to vent anti-authority aggression and to lament systemic racism
and police brutality. We can hear rap, even rap made of violent,
inchoate lyrics, about “the system” and law enforcement to be a
covered form of political speech. For example, NWA and Ice-T have
been valorized by the Art World. But even if they had self-published
their anti-police raps83 their message could be conceptualized as
political speech. In short, without the historical context, a judge might
not be able to identify or understand a rap’s subtextual political
message.
But there are two core doctrinal problems with the arguments
advanced by the law and rap community. First, the early demographic
history of rap does not map squarely onto who produces or consumes
rap music today. Statistical disciplines like criminology show the odious

82. Schauer, supra note 12, at 1785 n.104 (identifying important political speech theories
“based on self-government or democratic deliberation”).
83. E.g., Fuck tha Police, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuck_tha_Police (last
visited Feb. 21, 2021) (“a protest song by American hip hop group N.W.A.”); Cop Killer (song),
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cop_Killer_(song) (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (Ice-T
collaboration with metal band Body Count).

KERR_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

196

3/17/2021 6:50 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

racial patterns at work in who ends up in jail after drafting rap lyrics.
But a threats analysis works at the individual level to discern one’s
intent. If any American, regardless of race or class, is allowed to dress
up a true threat by parroting a rap lyric, allowing them to do so obscures
the relevant historical genealogy of rap and distorts criminal law
doctrine. For example, Anthony Elonis was a white man without a
history of writing, let alone vocalizing, raps.84 Do we need to situate his
Facebook post within a cultural tradition of protest rap? We can assume
that the amicus briefers were worried about the background subtext of
a generation of young black men who are too eager to share their
amateur raps on the internet, and thus argue for a kind of blanket
coverage that protects sympathetic black voices as well. But this
individual-group conflation points to the tensions in operationalizing a
normative socio-legal critique and encourages the amici to ignore the
problem of artfulness.
The second doctrinal problem is that these briefs make assumptions
about aesthetic quality based on genre conventions. They cite to a few
important rap songs that have included potentially threatening lyrics as
evidence of a genre-wide convention, and then situate Elonis’s lyrics
about his wife, Bell’s lyrics about his gym teachers, or Knox’s lyrics
name-checking his arresting officers as merely following that genre
convention. The mistaken logic is that “if those prior raps are violent,
and these contested lyrics are also violent, then these contested lyrics
must be raps as well.” But this reasoning largely ignores the important
gatekeeper function of the Art World: It forgets that these cited rap
songs were already vetted as artful before they became popular or
influential. The amici’s point conflates prior raps’ descriptive use of
violence and their constitutionality as proxy for all raps’
constitutionality. But it is important to distinguish those raps, which had
been validated by the Art World and were thus received by listeners as
both non-literal and aesthetic even though their raps happened to
detail violence, from the unartful attempted raps at issue in Elonis, Bell,
and Knox. Artfulness is the constitutional linchpin: It is why we cover
(and the only reason why we are able to cover) the apolitical,
potentially threatening raps of Eminem and Tupac.

84. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Ms. Elonis further testified
that Elonis rarely listened to rap music, and that she had never seen Elonis write rap lyrics during
their seven years of marriage.”).
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VII. ONE CASE, TWO WAYS
A. Was Jamal Knox doing political speech?
Jamal Knox was arrested as part of a routine traffic stop that
escalated when he and a co-defendant fled the vehicle on foot.85 He was
apprehended, and police discovered fifteen bags of heroin on his
person along with a wad of cash.86 He was charged for a number of
crimes, including providing a false name and possessing a stolen gun.87
While his case was pending, Knox and his co-defendant wrote and
recorded a rap song titled “Fuck the Police.”88 Knox’s lyrics vivify his
animosity toward the local Pittsburgh police unit. Most of the lyrics are
rote puffery and flexing typical of gangster rap. But Knox also adds a
granular level of detail in his first verse that makes his amateur rap
uniquely threatening: He “refer[s] to Officer Kosko and Detective
Zeltner by name” and insults them in language too graphic for the text
of this paper.89 In doing so, the rap is transformed into a particularized
threat to these two law enforcement officers, triggering a true threats
analysis.
The specificity of this reference negates its generic value as antipolice political speech. It is a distortion of the concept of political
speech to claim that it includes name-dropping private individuals. The
rap scholars’ brief observes without citation that “rap music and other
forms of political protest do indeed single out people by name.”90 It is
certainly true that rap lyrics, like those of many musical genres, have
referred explicitly to elected politicians, well-known bureaucrats, and
other popular artists.91 But when a lyricist makes direct reference to a
public official, we interpret the reference to be mere fantasy or
reflective of a broader ideological critique because of the nonliteral
nature of rap as art. A recent well-known example of this kind of
political namedrop is “FDT” (2016) by rappers YG and Nipsey Hussle.
“FDT” is short for “Fuck Donald Trump,” and was written in response
85.
86.
87.
88.

Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1148 (Pa. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 1149.
Id. Not to be confused with “Fuck Tha Police” by iconic rap group N.W.A., supra note

83.
89. Id. at 1149–50.
90. Brief of Amici Curiae Michael Render (“Killer Mike”), Erik Nielson, and Other Artists
and Scholars in Support of Petitioner at 17, Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018),
cert. denied sub nom. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
91. See, e.g., EMINEM, ‘TILL I COLLAPSE (Interscope Records 2001) (rapping about his
“beef” with Nas, JAY-Z, and a number of other popular artists).
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to Trump’s divisive 2016 presidential campaign.92 The celebrity of
Donald Trump gives the song a popular appeal that made the rap a
topical political anthem. It is a critique of Trump’s persona and
campaign message—not a literal description of what these rappers
want to happen to Trump in real life. This public/private distinction is
consistent with how we think about reputation more generally in the
law. For example, private persons need to prove mere negligence in a
defamation suit because private individuals are unable to marshal the
resources to defend themselves against a defamatory statement.93
Likewise, we interpret raps about famous people non-literally in part
because as public officials, they attract public attention. We assume
from there that public critique is a normal consequence of placing
yourself in the public discourse.
In Knox, both Officer Kosko and Detective Zeltner are employees
of the state. They each wear a police badge, the chevron of authority.
But when Officer Kosko is not in uniform, he’s a private citizen. On the
other hand, elected public officials are always on the job. It is less clear
whether regular state employees, even those who work in law
enforcement, always personify the state. If an individual police officer
is already well-known because of alleged wrongdoing, then she is a
viable target for political speech. But threatening an otherwise
unknown law enforcement officer offers no public appeal and instead
personalizes a song, so that the officer reasonably feels in danger of her
own safety. Whereas referring generically to a “cop who arrested me”
would universalize the experience and imbue the lyric with political
gravity.
B. Was Jamal Knox doing aesthetic speech?
A similarly difficult question is whether Knox’s rap qualifies as art
under the First Amendment. Kleinman interpreted Hurley to mean that
the first Amendment only covers “great art.”94 We should not read
Hurley’s references to Lewis Carroll and Jackson Pollock to suggest
that only art that is the standard of our cultural canon is covered by the
First Amendment. Rather, the Court was simply citing well-known
92. See, e.g., Christopher R. Weingarten, YG Talks Summer Protest Anthem ‘FDT (F—k
Donald Trump)’, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/musicfeatures/yg-talks-summer-protest-anthem-fdt-f-k-donald-trump-249942/.
93. See Michael Pierce, Prosecuting Online Threats After Elonis, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 995,
1003 (2016) (arguing courts should apply a hybrid approach that “focus[es] on the identity of the
target and impose[s] a higher mens rea standard when the target is a public figure”).
94. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 2010).
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examples of seemingly “meaningless” art to illustrate a doctrinal
point—that art does not have to convey a particularized meaning
qualify as art. Furthermore, institutional gatekeepers have long
distinguished art from non-art, but certainly there has been art of
variable quality published or curated since time immemorial. This
paper does not propose a neat standard for the threshold art vs. nonart distinction under First Amendment doctrine. Rather, my proposed
working test is that for a rap to become “art speech” it must be
cognizable as rap-as-art. Essential to evaluating if a rap is artful is how
it impacts a listener.
Any honest reviewer would remark that “Fuck the Police” by Knox
and Beasley is much better than its transcribed lyrics alone would
indicate. This supports the observation that lyrical quality is generally
a weak index of the overall listenability of a rap song. Knox and Beasley
are each competent rappers—they can flow in the pocket and vary their
delivery in response to beat shifts. The most interesting bar is when
Knox states: “My momma told me not to put this on CD/ but I’m gonna
make this fuckin’ city believe me.”95 This seems to echo the same metaawareness observed in Elonis’s references to the risky nature of
distributing threatening lyrics and his disclaimers about the veracity of
his own lyrics. We can plausibly interpret this line to suggest a similar
kind of aesthetic awareness on the part of Knox and to reinforce the
rap’s non-literal intent. This might read too much into the meaning of
Knox’s lyrics. But this fourth wall reflection on how audiences might
receive his lyrics goes to the constructedness of the song and suggests
that he aims to rap for a generalized audience.
Knox is a tough case. This is in large part because the First
Amendment paradigm requires distinguishing aesthetic intent from a
subjective intent to threaten—under blackletter doctrine, a speech act
cannot have blended intent. A threat is conceptualized as a kind of
physical action, which allows us to make a content-based value
judgment and thus disfavor the speech. This creates strange outcomes
such as where a rap could pass First Amendment muster if it was
minimally artful yet extremely threatening.96 If a rap meets the

95. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1150 (Pa. 2018).
96. Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 202 (2012)
(suggesting the need for a balancing test); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 829 (noting the
converse to this problem, “[a]s far as Brandenburg is concerned, a person who deliberately incites
others to commit a minor offense is in the same position as a person who incites others to riot. In
both cases, the speech is equally unprotected.”).
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threshold standard of artfulness, then we are simply indifferent to the
intensity or directness of the threat. It is already in the covered zone of
art speech. We can put an “explicit” label on its album cover and
prevent it from being played on the radio or at schools. But it cannot
be criminalized once it is deemed art speech.
Of course, this is not the calculus that was used prior to modern
First Amendment doctrine,97 nor is it the kind of decision-making
process that has ever been used by the Art World. Rather, we can
assume that institutional gatekeepers employed a sort of balancing test
that considered both the aesthetic value of the song and how a
potentially threatening line might sound. The more reputable an artist
is the more likely a record label A&R or a record producer would
publish the potentially threatening line.98 And presumably, a competent
record producer would likely suggest editing a line like the one in
“Fuck the Police” that individuated local police officers.
Other approaches to unpacking criminal and aesthetic intent have
been proposed. Justice Alito in his Elonis dissent offered a recklessness
test for art threats in which the speaker or artist acknowledges how an
audience is likely to receive a posted or recorded lyric.99 This audienceawareness approach would require the artist to consider the medium of
expression and her expected audience. In other words, would-be
rappers should recognize how posting lyrics on the internet may distort
a post from its original context or intended meaning.100 The
permanence of internet communication reifies the “present-ness” of a
communicative act, extending the lingering sense of threat that a reader
might feel.101 At the same time, an artist can claim that sharing a rap
publicly on the internet demonstrates that she expects a generalized
audience of listeners.102
Alito’s test is novel because it contemplates that aesthetic and bad
intent might co-exist. Indeed, Alito himself might not realize how this
97. See, e.g., Lakier, supra note 18, at 2179–82 (explaining the difference between First
Amendment jurisprudence in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and the Court’s approach to
freedom of speech and expression in the twentieth century).
98. For example, Tupac’s references to east coast rap foes in “Hit ‘Em Up” or Eminem’s
repeat references to his ex-wife in his early oeuvre.
99. Elonis v. United States 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2014–16 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
100. P. Brooks Fuller, Evaluating Intent in True Threats Cases: The Importance of Context in
Analyzing Threatening Internet Messages, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37, 50 (2015).
101. John Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally Protected
Expression, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 633 (2016).
102. Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1145, 1166–67 (2013).
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synthetic understanding of intent may destabilize the very core of the
First Amendment regime. It also seems to require that judges perform
a quality control role, previously assigned to the Art World, and forces
the artist to consider both her likely audience and whether a listener
will reasonably assume that a rap is targeting them as an individual. The
problem with this audience-aware approach is that it favors the known
over the unknown artist.103 There is a real fear that a recklessness
standard might chill the kind of provocative art speech that we want to
encourage in our First Amendment culture. For example, an unknown
artist might be discouraged from taking creative risks, thereby
perpetuating her status as an unknown artist. Still, the Alito test is an
important innovation because it reminds us of the real reason that we
cover art speech—not because it contributes to our marketplace of
ideas, vitalizes our political discourse, or empowers speaker autonomy,
but because there is a qualitative aesthetic value internal to First
Amendment culture.104
VIII. WHY WE COVER ART
A. A Marketplace of Art Speech
It is necessary to understand the legal moorings of art speech before
considering possible ways to cover and secure it in our post-gatekeeper
world. Justifying protection on a Holmesian marketplace of ideas
principle has little merit. That is because the First Amendment largely
does not care about the idea represented in a given artwork, or if it
represents one at all. There are two theories of aesthetic experience:
mentalists, who focus on how the mind receives an artwork in context,
and sensualists, who consider how people experience pleasure through
art.105 Each is consistent with the fact that an artwork does not have to
convey an effable idea to nevertheless be artful. This is also true of rap,
especially in the new paradigm of a rap world where sound is
prioritized over meaning. For example, I have listened to
“EARFQUAKE,” the standout single from Tyler the Creator’s 2020
Grammy-winning rap album IGOR, innumerable times over the last
year, but I still have no clue what rapper Playboi Carti is even saying

103. Kerr, supra note 43, at 90.
104. Tushnet, supra note 96, at 173 (suggesting that we assume nonrepresentational art is
covered “because we think that such art is, in some sense, a ‘good thing’”).
105. See, e.g., Peter Brooks, An erotics of art, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1975),
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/09/14/archives/an-erotics-of-art-the-pleasure-of-the-text-sz.html.
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on his signature guest verse.106 It’s clearly awesome. It’s also
unintelligible to the casual listener. For the reader’s convenience, here
are some of the song’s lyrics107:
We ain’t gotta ball, D. Rose, huh
I don’t give a fuck ‘bout none’, huh
Beamin’ like fuck my lungs, huh
Just might call my lawyer, huh
Plug gon’ set me up, huh (Yeah)
Bih’, don’t set me up (Okay)
I’m with Tyler, yuh (Slime)
He ride like the car, huh
And she wicked, huh, yuh
Like Woah Vicky, huh, yeah (Like Woah Vicky)
Oh, my God, hold up, um
Diamonds not Tiffany, huh, yeah (Woah, woah)
So in love
So in love

It is still not wholly obvious to me what Playboi Carti is rapping
about, but I am confident that having completed this rap-reading
exercise will have a negligible impact on my future enjoyment of
listening to this song. The reason I like it is because of its sonic impact.
The marketplace of ideas is irrelevant here, because no coherent idea
is communicated.
B. Art speech as political speech
Other theorists have argued that art speech is covered by the First
Amendment because exposure to art elevates our political sensibility.
These post hoc moves to cover art speech confuse the benefits of an
arts education with the precise First Amendment question of why or
how we determine that certain artworks are covered. Marci Hamilton
suggested in her article, “Art Speech,” that aesthetic expression is a
kind of pre-verbal or non-discursive form of political expression.108
106. See Earfquake, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earfquake (last visited Feb.
20, 2021) (noting that the song features a guest appearance of “American rapper Palyboi Carti”).
107. EARFQUAKE, GENIUS.COM, https://genius.com/Tyler-the-creator-earfquake-lyrics
(last visited Feb. 20, 2021).
108. Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 103–09 (1996).
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Others have viewed the arts as inspiring anti-government criticism or
imagination that are fundamental to self-government.109 Even
Alexander Meiklejohn, who is recognized as advocating for limiting
First Amendment protections to political speech, argued that
“literature and the arts must be protected by the First Amendment …
[because] they lead the way toward sensitive and informed application
and response to the values out of which the riches of the general
welfare are created.”110 These connections feel tenuous because of the
breadth and generality of the argument.111 Many human activities “lead
the way” to an appreciation of constitutional values; for example
running a small business, or even ticket scalping might inspire reflection
on First Amendment values.112 A political speech rationale lacks
explanatory power here.
C. Art speech as autonomy
The marketplace of ideas and political speech theories of why the
First Amendment covers art each have an instrumental orientation: to
improve the quality and range of our ideas, or to rarefy our political
sensibility. The other theory that has been proposed by scholars is the
deontological value of speaker autonomy.113 This theory posits that the
First Amendment incorporates an expansive notion of speech because
speech is important in itself, expression nurtures inchoate thoughts, and
speech helps us explore the frontiers of our imagination and develops
our sense of self.114 This kind of identity value converges with Justice
Kennedy’s thinking about personal destiny and vision of self.115 But this

109. See id. at 76 (“Art permits individuals to experience alternative worlds, thereby
providing an efficient and effective means of testing the status quo without risk.”); see also Patricia
Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1580–81 (1984) (noting that
some art has “emotive” content that is “not devoid of political content” and may “undermine the
assumption of systemic order and stability”).
110. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
257.
111. See Blocher, supra note 56, at 131 (observing that Meiklejohn’s argument “may be a bit
of stretch”).
112. Tushnet, supra note 96, at 173.
113. See generally T. M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?,
97 VA. L. REV. 541 (2011); see also Eberle, supra note 15, at 19 (arguing for art coverage based
on theories of self-realization).
114. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982)
(describing free speech as a vehicle for self-realization).
115. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (“Roe recognized the right of a woman
to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the
protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental
significance in defining the rights of the person.”).
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autonomy value alone does not explain what distinguishes art speech
from the Jed Rubenfeld example of the sports car-loving libertarian
who feels the urge to express herself by breaking the speed limit.116 An
autonomy rationale could be marshaled to justify any and all of the
many quotidian or anti-social things said or done each day. It simply
covers too much.117
D. Art speech as culturally important speech
The best explanation of why art speech is covered by the First
Amendment, or why any sort of speech is covered by the First
Amendment, is because it is core to our First Amendment culture.118
Professor Schauer encouraged us to
consider the possibility that the most logical explanation of the
actual boundaries of the First Amendment might come less from an
underlying theory of the First Amendment and more from the
political, sociological, cultural, historical, psychological, and
economic milieu in which the First Amendment exists and out of
which it has developed.119

Dean Post echoes this same culture-based intuition, writing that the
boundaries of the First Amendment are “anthropologically
apparent.”120 The First Amendment covers things that we like (good
art), and it covers things that we usually do not like (crude political
speech, ignorant speech), but we tolerate it because we want to serve
other cultural goals like having a vibrant democracy or protecting the
free trade of ideas.121

116. This is a widely shared critique. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 44, at 12 n.38 (citing Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971))
(“[T]he important point is that these [autonomy] benefits do not distinguish speech from any
other human activity.”); see, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment
Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 772 (1986) (noting that theories of “self-expression” are
insufficient because “they do not distinguish speaking from a wide range of other self-expressive
activities that fall outside the purview of the first amendment”).
117. See Scanlon, supra note 113, at 546 (“The chief problem with ‘autonomy’ is that it is
commonly understood in too many different ways.”).
118. See Amy Adler, Performance Anxiety: Medusa, Sex and the First Amendment, 21 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 227, 228 (2009) (referring to Professor Adler’s own scholarly project as a “cultural
theory of the First Amendment”).
119. Schauer, supra note 12, at 1787.
120. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L.
REV. 617, 623 (2011).
121. In terms of Bobbitt’s modalities, the former reason is ethical, the latter reasons are
prudential. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Methods of Constitutional Argument, 23 U. BRIT. COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 453, 457 (1989) (describing prudential and ethical arguments).
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Tautological as it may be, we like good art because we like good art.
But the quality control work of prior institutional gatekeepers gave
content to this notion of “good art.” Without these gatekeepers, the law
community is forced to define the general principles that delimit First
Amendment coverage.
Take, for example, Lewis Carroll’s “Jabberwocky.” Joseph
Blocher’s recent contribution on nonsense speech is an erudite look at
defining and valuing the use of nonsense in society, and elegantly
situates Justice Souter’s reference to “Jabberwocky” in Hurley.122 I first
explicate a threshold issue that is both obvious yet essential:
“Jabberwocky” was not shared by an unknown author on an internet
forum. Rather, it was written by the celebrated author Lewis Carroll,
and included as part of his novel, Through the Looking-Glass, and What
Alice Found There, the sequel to Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.123
This background context primes the reader to recognize it as literary
writing. It has already met the threshold standards of the Art World
(here, the world of literary publication), and it is read against this
implicit quality control work. Lewis Carroll was himself a lecturer at
Oxford. Certainly, this credential adds an aura of reputation and quality
surrounding his work. Finally, Jabberwocky is not simply nonsense. It is
lyrical and full of whimsy, and reading Jabberwocky is a pleasurable
aesthetic experience. It is really good nonsense.124
In short, the First Amendment covers good art. But the coverage
question remains largely unarticulated because it depends on
naturalized perceptions about art that are part of our “social milieu.”125
Prior to the internet, courts and legal officials deferred to institutional
gatekeepers and the consumer art market for determinations of art
speech. We can critique the normative legitimacy of such a regime.
Certainly, record executives and other Art World players might be
more motivated by profit than elevating public taste. But this is a
descriptive account of how the prior First Amendment regime worked.
Now amateur artists—like amateur rappers—can disseminate their
attempts at art to an internet audience, thereby circumventing the
122. See generally Blocher, supra note 56.
123. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE
19–20 (1872).
124. Perhaps the context of it being a novel is irrelevant to its aesthetic value. See Susan
Stuart, Shibboleths and Ceballos: Eroding Constitutional Rights Through Pseudocommunication,
2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (2008) (“In the context of Lewis Carroll’s children’s story,
Jabberwocky has no meaning, at least that an adult audience could discern.” (emphasis added)).
125. Schauer, supra note 12, at 1787.

KERR_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

206

3/17/2021 6:50 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

traditional role of the “gatekeeper.”
The problem for internet rappers is that some of these potential
audiences might not “get it” or have a desire to learn how to appreciate
rap. Therefore, I argue (1) for a civic response to the gatekeeper
problem by institutionalizing a rap guild or (2) to re-imagine the state’s
role in doing quality control work that used to be done by record labels.
IX. PROPOSALS
A. A rap guild
My first proposal is that rappers create a sort of self-regulated guild
based on internal standards of quality to recreate the work once done
by institutional gatekeepers. This move would add a layer of
institutional credibility for unsigned rappers or rappers who choose to
self-release their music and make membership based on community
standards of aesthetics rather than relying on the marketing calculi of
record label execs.126 A rap guild would not manage individual rapper’s
choices as to what or when to release music to the internet, and so its
“quality control” work would be limited to membership decisions. This
is consistent with the evolutionary nature of rap. The social definition
of rap seems to be whatever the aesthetic output is of people who look
or act like rappers.127 This lack of a rigid sonic template for rap is
liberatory and exciting in some ways and informs recent aesthetic
moves like the sing-songy trap of Young Thug and Travis Scott, or emorap of Lil Peep and Juice WRLD. But this rapper-inflected definition of
rap is also problematic. When genre-hopping musicians like Drake128 or
Tyler the Creator129 aim to expand their catalog and produce non-rap

126. Cf. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 508 (2001) (observing how
certain cultural groups have First Amendment expression protections because of constructed
notions of insularity and group membership).
127. Cf. Schauer, supra note 19, at 1275 (“[W]e investigate whether that value is situated
significantly within and thus disproportionately served by some existing social institution whose
identity and boundaries are at least moderately identifiable. If so, then we might develop a kind
of second-order test. If there is a reporter’s privilege, for example, we might ask not whether this
exercise of the privilege serves primary First Amendment purposes, but instead simply whether
the person claiming the privilege is a reporter.”).
128. Joey Nolfi, Drake Disputes His Grammy Category: ‘Hotline Bling’ is ‘Not a Rap Song’,
ENT. WKLY (Feb. 19, 2017), https://ew.com/grammys/2017/02/19/drake-grammys-hotline-blingnot-rap-song/.
129. Toyin Owoseje, Tyler, The Creator Slams Grammys’ ‘Urban’ Category as a Politically
Correct Version of the N-word, CNN (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/27/
entertainment/tyler-the-creator-grammys-intl-scli/index.html.
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songs, the music industry still categorizes these R&B or pop songs as
“rap.”
There are also core critiques about the viability or ethos of such a
guild. It admittedly would be quite difficult to administer a guild made
up of likely hundreds of thousands of wannabe rappers. The Screen
Actors Guild (SAG) provides a helpful analogy. Perhaps the threshold
institutional setting of a Hollywood film explains in part why we never
see criminal cases related to statutory rape or contributing to child
delinquency. In a way, the Hollywood depictions of these crimes still
satisfy their strict liability nature. It would be similarly surprising to see
an actor’s film work cited as evidence in a courtroom. Because the SAG
does the ex-ante work of declaring who is an “actor” (analogous to a
rapper in the context of this proposal), we assume work performed by
guild members is a professional attempt at “art” and thus has zero legal
relevance. Another way to frame this is that the Art World, or SAG, is
making the kinds of quasi-legal decisions I referred to earlier about
aesthetic quality through its selection of members that we as social
actors rely on and defer to. These “easy cases” are never thought to be
litigated. But perhaps a scene depicting statutory rape in a low-budget
homemade indie film would be received differently by a court. Another
example is a stand-up comedian making a statement that would be
considered defamatory when being interviewed on the nightly news but
would be dismissed as a “joke” if recited on stage as part of a bit. The
institutional context distinguishes these seemingly congruent acted
scenes or lies/jokes. But hard cases still present themselves, such as a
comedian on a news-inflected talk show130 or naturalistic forms of
performance art.131 The problem is that the provocative artist might be
intentionally trying to blur and complicate contextual boundaries.
Indeed, that might be the very point of the artwork or performance. As
a result, art threats is “a very non-legal area of law” that is perhaps best
managed outside of courts.132
I sense that the law and rap community is trying to make a similar
argument that all rap should be assumed to have zero legal relevance,
130. See, e.g., Joseph Ax, Trump Withdraws “Orangutan” Lawsuit Against Comic Bill Maher,
REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/entertainment-us-usa-trumplawsuit/trump-withdraws-orangutan-lawsuit-against-comic-bill-maheridUSBRE9310PL20130402 (revealing that Donald Trump withdrew his lawsuit against Bill
Maher for calling Trump the son of an orangutan).
131. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 11, at 184–85 (2012) (noting that performance art that
would include defacing public property should violate the First Amendment).
132. Kerr, supra note 43, at 102.
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for either threats analysis or probative value in evidence. To this extent
the creation of a rap guild similar to the Screen Actors Guild could help
them achieve these desired ends. But the SAG is also a labor union, and
this professional distinction allows it to control membership based on
pay stubs or other gatekeeper determinations of quality. My rap guild
proposal is specifically non-economic in nature, which complicates
membership evaluation.
Finally, we might wonder if a rap guild conflicts with the very ethos
of rap. Rap is commonly thought of as a transgressive genre. Perhaps
an institutional organization is at odds with an anarchic, rebellious
ethos that still manifests in many kinds of rap today. I am certainly open
to other novel forms of gatekeeping that maintain the integrity of this
ever-evolving genre. I am also unsure if today’s rappers are necessarily
anarchic, or at least any more anarchic than any other genre of
musicians. Some of our most famous rappers are known for their
organizing abilities and entrepreneurial talent.
B. The State as Quality Control Worker?
My second proposal is that the state enters the quality control space
that used to be managed by record labels or other gatekeepers like
book editors or film producers. At first blush, this might feel strange.
After all, political speech is core to freedom of speech jurisprudence,
and we typically interpret this to mean dissent. There seems to be an
obvious conflict of interest in allowing the state to do the work of
editing anti-state speech; it is the literal definition of censorship.
My proposal is limited to the production and distribution of art
speech. As I have argued, the jurisprudential basis for art speech is not
that it contributes to the marketplace of ideas or vitalizes democratic
self-government, but our shared sense that the First Amendment
should cover quality aesthetic expression for values internal to our
constitutional culture. There might not be any blackletter doctrine for
this. But nor are there any recorded cases of published rap or art being
deemed a true threat by a court. The only distinction between a song
like Tupac’s “Hit ‘Em Up” and Jamal Knox’s “Fuck the Police” is that
Tupac is considered a great rapper. In just the last half-decade, three
amateur rap threat cases have petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari. A fourth is inevitable.
The jurisprudential basis for art speech is the seeming tautology
that we like good art. It is not that controversial to think the
government should help people improve the quality of their art. Every
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day, governments make aesthetic decisions on which kind of art to fund,
or to curate in museums.133 Still, as rappers use words as part of the
construction of their songs, it is understandable why it might feel icky
if a government employee is influencing which words are vocalized in
a rap. This might faintly echo the problem of coercive thought in
Barnette v. West Virginia.134
I counter that this might depend on our rhetoric about the state,
and how we understand the precise job description of the quality
control worker. If the state is depicted as an Orwellian surveillance
regime, which has a monopoly on the use of violence, then this might
feel scary. But if we equate the state with a licensed social worker or
public-school guidance counselor, then maybe readers can be more
sanguine about this kind of quality control work. Amateur rappers or
performance artists do not benefit from the professional editing work
of record label or publishing house. A school counselor who is able to
explain to students why name-checking a private individual is received
differently than rapping about an institution or “the system” is not
necessarily distorting the identity of a student’s rap song, but she might
help this student avoid school suspension or a court visit.135 This
growing-pain concern is an important one in the context of rap threats,
where a subtext for cases like Elonis is the very many young people
who are simply writing their way through their early development as a
rapper. Likely, most of these potential art speech cases are already
managed by institutions like schools. We have in-person social spaces
that allow for managing and editing the misfires of the young artist so
that she can develop a sensibility of what is aesthetic, yet provocative.
The internet is less good at this.
In Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in a case involving a novice rapper who posted to
Facebook and YouTube a recording of a rap he wrote about allegations
concerning the lewd behavior of two gym coaches at his Mississippi
high school.136 Like the aesthetic output of most teenagers, Taylor Bell’s
133. Soucek, supra note 55, at 384–85.
134. See Enrique Armijo, The Freedom of Non-Speech, 33 CONST. COMMENT 291, 314–16
(2018) (contextualizing art speech within theories of First Amendment protection to not use
words, associated with scholars like Louis Michael Seidman and Martin Redish).
135. Interestingly, YG was visited by Secret Service after he released a music video and was
pressured to omit a line for the published album version that made reference to cartel kingpin El
Chapo. Adelle Platon, YG Says Secret Service Reached Out Following Release of Anti-Trump
Song, May Try to Take His Album Off Shelves, BILLBOARD (Apr. 27, 2016), https://
www.billboard.com/articles/columns/hip-hop/7348438/yg-secret-service-donald-trump-fdt.
136. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert denied 136 S. Ct. 1166,
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lyrics lacked sophistication and tact. But they also inflected some
topical rap devices (e.g., “Run up on T-Bizzle” echoes the lexicon of
Snoop Dogg) and rhymed.137 It was a clear attempt at rap, even if not a
very good one. It also mentioned inserting “a pistol down [one of the
coach’s] mouth” and referred to these coaches and the school by
name.138 Bell was suspended for seven days and had to spend the rest
of the grading period (approximately six weeks) at the county
alternative school.139 An en banc Fifth Circuit panel upheld the school
board’s decision.140
This case is further complicated by the fact that school
administrators must balance individual rights of self-expression with
the exigencies of moral education and discipline.141 But this same
mandate for moral education could re-frame how school personnel
managed Taylor Bell’s case. A seven-day suspension, six weeks at the
county alternative school and not being allowed to attend school
functions feels like quite a draconian sentence for an attempted rap.
Perhaps instead a counselor could have worked with Bell to edit or
remove these lyrics after his internet posts were discovered by school
administration. The First Amendment acts as a sort of social safety
valve.142 We should allow individuals to vocalize anti-social or violent
thoughts so they do not manifest as violent action. This safety valve
function informs the history of “battle rapping,” in which live
participants in a freestyle “cypher” traded barbs and insults in rhyme
form.
But the problem today is that an amateur rapper might think they
are merely performing something like a “battle rap” when the internet
listener (e.g., Bell’s gym coach) is unaware of this genre context. A
battle rap that is not rapped in-person in direct view of the audience,
but that is instead posted to an unmediated internet is likely received
quite differently. In Wittgensteinian terms, Bell was using rap-like
language for an audience who was not part of the relevant rap language
1166 (2016).
137. Bell, 799 F.3d at 384.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 385.
140. Id. at 389.
141. See id. at 389–90 (noting that a student’s First Amendment rights must be “tempered”
in light of the specific functions of school and education). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (noting that a student “may express his opinions . . . if
he does so without materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of others”).
142. THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
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game. It is an example of cultural discord that seems resolvable outside
of an institutional setting. We should consider non-legalist143 responses
to what are social problems prompted by our evolving internet speech
culture.
CONCLUSION
Rap is art. However, that does not mean that all who attempt to rap
are necessarily artists or record artful songs. This is axiomatic of all
musical genres and all forms of art. The word “art” is commonly
assumed to connote a threshold of quality. We apply this word only to
paintings, or songs, or performances that are good. And so, although my
paper clarifies that the First Amendment does not necessarily cover the
written or recorded raps of amateur rappers, it also reminds the legal
world that not all rap speech is equal. This is a good thing as well.
The law and rap community seems to want to insulate attempts at
rap from both courtroom use and threats analysis. But while their
motivations are sympathetic, their logic functions to deny the nobility
of rap as compared to other music genres. There is a legitimation cost
to declaring that all attempted raps are covered by the First
Amendment, that bad rap, or even Justice Alito’s feigned rap, is equal
to good rap.144 This reinforces a societal perspective that rap is simple,
unrefined, rote or juvenile.145 That it’s a kind of folk tradition rather
than an aesthetic form of music.
This kind of popular, or folk, approach to rap is reflected in perhaps
the most formative contribution to law and rap scholarship, Paul
Butler’s “Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment.”146
Butler’s groundbreaking paper cites to rap as a form of cultural
authority, as an index of community views about different theories of
criminal jurisprudence. His paper reflects a novel way to approach
issues of community justice and can be situated within his wider
intellectual project on jury nullification.147

143. See generally JUDITH N. SKLAR, LEGALISM (1964) (describing why legalism as theory
does not appropriately balance morality and politics).
144. Cf. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1405–12 (2009) (discussing the “legitimation costs” of the creation of
a constitutional right to abortion).
145. Cf. Anthony Kronman, Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 311, 312–13
(1999) (positing that poetry has aristocratic inclinations).
146. Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV.
983 (2004).
147. See generally Paul Butler, Racially-Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
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But to the extent his paper is a theory of folk jurisprudence, and
how ideas about criminal justice percolate through a community of
rappers and rap audiences, then his theory is necessarily more about
ideas than about the aesthetic quality of rap. Ideas were likely much
more important to early genres of rap, like the political rap of Public
Enemy in the 1980s or the conscious rap of the 1990s associated
individuals like Mos Def and Common. Today ideas don’t matter as
much in rap. However, if we build a theory of rap based in its idealized
vision of justice, this leads the law and rap community to think about
the demographics of rappers and the other societal problems they face.
This all sounds good in theory. But it also causes us to forget the
fundamental qualitative determinations that go into the production
and distribution of rap as an art. This aesthetic basis of rap justifies its
constitutional coverage as art speech. Prior to the internet we didn’t
need to think about these aesthetic thresholds because published rap
had necessarily been vetted (and likely edited) in the quality control
work of our gatekeepers. But now that the amateur rapper, or the
feigned rapper, can simply upload their seemingly threatening rap to
the internet, we need to rethink fundamental coverage questions. These
are broad principles, and they seem to reduce to facile metrics like
likeability and quality.148 This makes the coverage boundaries feel a bit
non-legal and perhaps beyond judicial ken. But maybe this is a reason
why we should finesse these boundaries and allow new sorts of
intervention to help with the quality control work that the old
gatekeepers no longer do, so that we can help young artists learn the
recognized boundaries of their artform outside of the court system.

Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995) (arguing for the increased consideration of race by black
jurors in criminal cases involving black defendants).
148. Cf. Post, supra note 6, at 1272 (“The most general statement of this point is that all legal
values are rooted in the experiences associated with local and specific kinds of social practices.”).

